

Polit. Summary vol 1/24.

THE
EVIDENCE
OF THE
Common and Statute Laws
OF THE REALM;
USAGE, RECORDS, HISTORY,
WITH THE
GREATEST AND BEST AUTHORITIES,
DOWN TO THE 3^d OF GEORGE THE III^d,
IN PROOF OF
THE RIGHTS OF BRITONS
THROUGHOUT THE
BRITISH EMPIRE.
ADDRESSED TO THE
PEOPLE.

L O N D O N:
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E R R A T A.

Page 5. line 11. instead of---that the legislative being is only a fiduciary power.—read *that the legislative being only a fiduciary power.*

Page 8. line 19. instead of—if we had said—read *if he had said.*

Page 36. line 3 from the bottom. Instead of—the bill or grant it presented to him—read *the bill or grant is presented to him.*



TO THE
P E O P L E
O F
E N G L A N D.

GENTLEMEN,

IF Parliaments are invested with an absolute, unconditional power, why may they not exempt their members from taxation? The right could not legally be contested, because their promulged will, is law; which to resist, would be high treason. Why may they not pass an act, asserting the dignity, and expence of their stations; and that, for the support of the former, and discharge of the latter, every Peer of the Realm should have two, and every Commoner one thousand pounds per annum, with exemption from taxes? And if to this, they voted themselves and heirs perpetual, they would do nothing but what was right, and has ever, to a

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similar effect, been done by every uncontrollable, absolute, unconditional power; from the mighty Nimrod, down to the Elector of Hanover. As to the executive, there are many ways of getting its assent, besides doubling the income of the civil list. But here, I would have the Oxonian Lycurgus consider, that should this doctrine become Catholick, and established, the revenues of the People would be so absorbed in the *legal* support of their rulers, that the treasury would not have wherewith to reward his, and Shebbeare's *pious* endeavours, in fixing the Government upon such legal, and constitutional principles.

But as Parliaments have not gone such lengths, notwithstanding their tenaciousness of what they conceive to be their right.—Notwithstanding the exorbitant claims of power, made even by each separate state, at various times.—Notwithstanding the desires of the constituent members (in common with the rest of their species) for riches, and power, and their opinion, that what they are rightfully, and lawfully possessed of, they may use at their discretion: I say, if notwithstanding all those powerful interests to stimulate Parliaments, they have not yet gone such lengths, it must appear to every man, intermediate to the Bedlamite, the Lunatic, and the perspicacious Doctor Johnson, that Parliaments did never consider themselves as acting with absolute, unconditional,

conditional, and uncontrollable power. And in order to get rid of this question for ever, together with the imperinent nonsense of that Fungous of literature, who, in mockery of genius and abilities, and in disgrace of the sound understanding of this nation, has been held up as the mirror of learning, I will mention a statute upon the power of Parliaments, it is the 25th of Henry the VIIIth, cap. 21. which being declarative, and in affirmative of the ancient common law, will at once develop as well the nature, as power of Parliaments.—It asserts, “that the realm of England is free from subjection to all laws, but such as have been made within it for its *wealth*, or such other, as the *people* of the realm have taken at *their free liberty*, by *their own consent*, to be used among them; and *have bound themselves*, by long *use* and *custom*, to the observance of the same; and that all the accustomed, and ancient laws of this realm, were originally established as laws by the *said sufferance, consents, and custom*; and *none* otherwise.”

Hence it is evident, that under what ever form, or authority, laws have been enacted, or introduced, they received their binding force from the sufferance, consent, and acquiescence of the people at large; and to make use of the strong words of the statute, “*and none otherwise.*” Hence also, it naturally follows, that any statute,

or law enacted in Parliament, which the people of the realm, I mean the great body of Freeholders, and freemen, should conceive to be not for the wealth, or benefit thereof; and in consequence withhold their sufferance, or consent; such withholding would be tantamount to an instant repeal. This statute further declares, "that
 " it standeth therefore with natural equity, and
 " good reason, that the King, the Lords Spiritual
 " and Temporal, and Commons, *representing* the
 " whole state of the realm; in the most High Court
 " of Parliament, have full power and authority
 " to dispense with all *human* laws; and every one
 " of them, as the quality of the persons, and mat-
 " ter shall require. And also the said laws to ab-
 "rogate, annul, amplify, or diminish, as to
 " King, Nobles, and Commons of the realm, pre-
 " sent in Parliament, shall seem most meet and con-
 " venient for the *wealth* of the realm." This is the constitution, as declared in the 25th, of Henry the VIIIth; in which, it is worthy of observation, that the High Court of Parliament, composed of King, Lords, and Commons, is described ONLY AS REPRESENTING the whole state of the realm. And as every person conversant with the history of Henry the VIIIth, must suppose, that a Parliament whereof he was so material a branch; and in an act, wherein it
 was

was declaring the plenitude of its power, would not describe itself as acting a subordinate part, if it could constitutionally, or even safely assume another. The legislative therefore acting for the people, as their representative, for their wealth, or benefit, as is by the statute declared, do consequently act under a trust for the good of the whole state of the realm; and in course legalizes, and constitutionally grounds the opinion of Mr. *Locke*, and other great writers, “ that
 “ the legislative being is only a fiduciary power to
 “ act for certain ends; there remains still inherent
 “ in the people a supreme power to remove, or
 “ alter the legislative, when they find the legislative
 “ act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for
 “ all power *given with trust*, for the attaining an
 “ end, being limited by that end, whenever that
 “ END is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the
 “ trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power
 “ devolve into the hands of those that gave it,
 “ who may place it a new, where they shall think
 “ best for their safety, and security. And thus the
 “ *community perpetually retains a supreme power* of
 “ SAVING THEMSELVES from the attempts and de-
 “ signs of any body, *even of their legislators*, when-
 “ ever they shall be so foolish, or so wicked, as
 “ to lay, and carry on designs against the liberties
 “ and properties of the subject. For no man, or
 “ society

“ society of men, have a power to deliver up
 “ their *preservation*, or consequently the means of
 “ it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of
 “ another ; whenever any one shall go about to
 “ bring them into such a slavish condition, they
 “ will always have a right to preserve, what they
 “ have not a power to part with ; and to rid them-
 “ selves of those, who invade this fundamental,
 “ sacred, and unalterable law, of *self preservation*,
 “ for which they entered into society ; and thus,
 “ the *community* may be said to be always the *su-*
 “ *preme power.*”

It must be confessed, that Mr. Justice Black-
 stone, though he seems to admit the principle in
 theory, says—“ we can not adopt it, nor ar-
 “ gue from it, under any dispensation of Govern-
 “ ment at present existing ; for this devolution of
 “ power to the people at large, includes in it, a
 “ dissolution of the whole form of Government
 “ *established by that people* ; reduces all the mem-
 “ bers to their original state of equality, and by
 “ annihilating the sovereign power, repeals all
 “ laws before enacted. No human laws will
 “ therefore suppose a case, which at once must
 “ destroy all law, and compel men to build afresh
 “ upon a new foundation ; nor will they make
 “ provision for so desperate an event, as must ren-
 “ der all legal provisions ineffectual. So long
 “ therefore

“ therefore as the English Constitution lasts, we
 “ may venture to affirm, that the power of Parlia-
 “ ment is absolute and without controul.”

As to the Reverend Judge's assertion, that we cannot adopt Mr. Locke's opinion, or argue from it, under the present dispensation of Government, I presume the contrary has been made appear out of the statute above recited ; which, by declaring the nature of the legislature to be representative, and its end, the Public Good ; when it alters the one, and departs from the other, it ceases to be that which the people made it, and becomes a self-created monster, that has converted the constitutional representation of the people into a Tyranny, and thereby dissolved the whole frame of government : but as the people of the realm, by the above statute, are not subject to any laws, except such as are made within it for its wealth, or such other as they have taken at their free liberty, by their own consent, this conversion of legal Government into a Tyranny, not being for the wealth of the realm, or done with the free liberty, and consent of the people, they are not subject to it. Here then is a statute in direct opposition to the learned Judge's assertion, as is also that fundamental principle of our constitution.—*Salus populi, suprema lex.*—The safety of the people

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is the supreme law: being the rule by which all others are to be tried. And as Mr. Locke's opinion is in perfect conformity with, and does as necessarily arise out of it, for its preservation, as the centripetal, and centrifugal forces, for that of the mundane system: it is to be marvelled at, that so very learned, able, and candid a writer, as the author of the Commentaries on the Laws of England, should endeavour to explode this right, clearly inferred both from common and statute law; founded upon the most just and necessary principle of self defence, the great law of nature; and without which, all other rights would be illusory, and nugatory.

Mr. Blackstone, in support of his assertion, says,—“that this devolution of power to the
“people at large, includes in it, a dissolution of the
“whole form of Government established by that
“people.” If we had said, that the breach of trust caused the dissolution, which is Mr. Locke's assertion; see Commentaries, chap. 2. and then argued against it, he would have been more candid: but this he could not consistently do, having, by adoption, but a few pages further in the same chapter, made this very theory his own.

As to the dissolution of Government, “repealing all positive laws before enacted,” historical facts establish the contrary.—William, Duke

Duke of Normandy, in one battle, conquered, and cut off almost the whole legislature of this country; the consequence of which was, an instant reproduction or issue of another, at the head of which this very William was placed as King, by the consent of the people, when he bound himself by a solemn oath to preserve the *rights* of the church, and to govern according to the *laws of the realm*: from which, it must appear that the rights of the church, and the laws of the realm, were *not* repealed by the dissolution of government, but continued in full vigour, as will further appear from the several charters of the ancient Saxons being pleaded, and allowed, and titles made by them to lands, liberties, franchises, and regalities, affirmed and adjudged under William I.—Again, when James the II^d, by a series of tyranny, abdicated the government, dissolved the Parliament, threw the Great Seal into the Thames, to prevent the calling of another, and fled out of the realm, what was the consequence? Another legislature was elected by the people at large; at the head of which, as an ETERNAL MONUMENT OF THE GRATITUDE OF ENGLISHMEN, they placed as King their glorious Deliverer, William Prince of Orange; and in the very instrument which conveyed the Crown, after

enumerating the black deeds of the tyrannical Stuart, the Lords and Commons, as they declare being a FULL and FREE representation of the people, passed the declaration of rights, and then disposed of the Crown.

From which facts it is evident, that by the Parliament's being dissolved, and the King fled the realm, there did not remain even a shadow of the very frame of government; and yet the laws were not repealed, being all in force to this moment, except such as have been annulled by subsequent statutes.

And as all Mr. Blackstone's arguments are founded upon this supposed repeal, that bottom being destroyed, they become the phantom of the brain.

Judge Vaughan, a great law authority, was so far from thinking a dissolution or annihilation of the High Court of Parliament repealed all positive laws, that he roundly asserts, that we have had laws made in this country, without the assistance of any, or all of the Parliamentary branches, and consequently must have been made or adopted by the immediate will of the people. His words, speaking of our fundamental laws are, "the laws of England were
" never the dictates of any conqueror's sword, or
" the placita, or good will and pleasure of any
" King

“ King of this nation, or to speak *impartially* and
 “ *freely*, the results of *any Parliament* that ever sat
 “ in this land.”

But if to this we bring in aid the learned author of the Commentaries own reasoning; we will even satisfy him, that the power of the people is alone absolute and without controul; and that all other powers are but dependencies upon this supreme power. Chap. 2d. Commentaries, he says, “ the whole form of government
 “ was established by the people; and if it was
 “ destroyed, they would have to build afresh.” Again speaking of an Act of Parliament, he says, “ that no power inferior to that which
 “ made it, can alter, annul, dispense, suspend,
 “ or repeal it.” His reasons, “ for it is a maxim
 “ in law, that it requires the same strength to
 “ dissolve, as to create an obligation.” This then being the legal criterion to judge by, if the reverend Judge will but apply it to the legislative, he must admit that the *strength*, that is, *the people at large* that created it, can dissolve it, and set up another; and so on, *ad infinitum*, till they have gotten one that will not enact *murder, famine, and rapine*, together with the *enslaving the souls and bodies of men* to be civil government. Wherefore, since Mr. Blackstone has laid it down as a rule in law, which, since

the days of Adam was a rule in reason, viz. that it requires the same strength to dissolve, as to create an obligation; we have law, reason, and the learned author of the Commentaries, in support of our assertion, that the legislature of England, consisting of King, Lords, and Commons, do not act with an absolute, uncontrollable power; because the people at large being the power that created them, they must act for the end of that creation (i. e.) the public good, else the PEOPLE may *dissolve* them, AND ELECT ANOTHER. And to this effect, in the debates between the Lords and Commons, it is said, "the government and magistracy are *under a trust*; and acting *contrary* to that trust, is a *renunciation of that trust*; for it is a plain declaration by act and deed, though not in writing, that he who hath the trust, and acting contrary is a disclaimer of it."

And the judicious Hooker in his Ecclesiastical Polity, "Sith men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent, we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living; and to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we are part, hath at any time before consented,
" *without*

“ without revoking the same after, by the like universal agreement.”

Again, “ Howbeit, laws do *not* take their constraining *quality* of such as devise them, but from THAT POWER which doth give them the strength of laws. Laws they are not, therefore, which public approbation hath not made so.

From all which we may with confidence assert that the idea of an absolute, unconditional, and uncontrollable power, residing any where out of the great body of freeholders and freemen, is contrary to the common and statute law of the land, — the law of nature, the first principle of which is self-preservation; and of reason, it being the grossest absurdity to suppose, that any body of men would delegate to another body, a right to impoverish or destroy themselves; or to speak more pertinently, that the wisest and greatest people on the earth should take from amongst themselves, a few of their fellows, and say—to one, you shall be King, to some, Lords, to others, Commons, but to all, you shall be absolute, unconditional and uncontrollable masters over our lives, liberties, and fortunes, together with those of our posterity; and from this day, forward, we consequently become most truly and absolutely your slaves. We make use of the terms, most truly
and

and absolutely, to contradistinguish the severity and unchangeableness of English slavery, from the mildness and changeableness of that of the blacks in the West-Indies. They being detained against their wills, and the laws of nature, their *christian* and *humane* masters think they appease God with their consciences, by allowing them eight hours out of every Sunday to acquire a little property for themselves; which in the course of twenty or thirty years, with the assistance of friends, may enable them to purchase their freedom; whereas, we being voluntary slaves, you are not answerable to God, and your consciences, for our situation. Our labour being therefore your property, there remains no hope of emancipation for us, but in *death*.

If this would not be the condition of the people of England, under a Parliament that was absolute, unconditional, and without controul, those words convey no ideas.

What effect such a power would have in this country, we may learn from its operation in another.—The Decemviri of Rome were elected by the people for one year, in order to compose a body of laws; but under the specious pretence of adding two more tables to the ten already promulgated, got their power continued
for

for another, which being expired, instead of dissolving themselves, they, *by their own votes, and in defiance of the discontents and murmurings of the people, continued their authority*, annulled the old law of an appeal to the people, and having *thereby* rased the fence against arbitrary dominion, made their power absolute, unconditional, and without controul. The Romans seeing that their servants, by converting themselves into their masters, had erected a tyranny, deplored their unhappy fate, poured in complaints from all parts, but assistance from none. Thus becoming *slaves* at home, they were *despised* abroad; *their dependencies* spurning the dominion of wretches *who had not the courage* to reclaim their own liberties, the Sabines and Æquians invaded their territories, routed their armies wherever they met with them, *the soldiers running away* before the enemy, suffered most shameful defeats; which losses and disgrace, so far from moving *the traitors* to resign, seemed rather to render them *more obstinate* in their diabolical measures; murder, rapine, and debaucheries of every kind being in Rome the daily and natural issue of this absolute, unconditional, uncontrollable legislature; whilst in the field the soldiers being dispirited, disaffected and unhappy, suffered themselves to be slaughtered,

tered, or driven like sheep before their enemies. At length, wearied out with a variety of oppressions, they were convinced that death was preferable to living under a legislature without controul, and consequently were easily roused to assert their liberties, by the conduct of Virginius, who finding his daughter Virginia, a young lady of great mental and personal accomplishments, seized upon by one of the *unaccountable* law-givers, for the purpose of gratifying his brutal lust, plunged a poniard in her breast, as the only resource left, under such a government, to preserve her chastity, and his family from dishonour. The people no sooner determined upon an exertion of their natural power, than these absolute, unconditional, uncontrollable legislators were hurled from the tribunal they had stained with so much blood, pollution, and rapine; liberty and property were restored, and with them private happiness and public prosperity.

From all which it must appear, that the Romans conceived their free government to be turned into a despotism, the instant the votes passed the Decemvirate for prolonging their power, and abrogating the appeal to the people. Then, and not till then, did their legislative (in our modern language) become absolute,
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unconditional, and without controul; the consequence of which, all Roman authors assert, to be every calamity a people could feel. At home, they were subject to uncontrolable lust, uncontrolable avarice, and uncontrolable ambition; to the first, fell a victim their wives and daughters; to the second and third, male and female of every rank, and every age; till at length, the whole City became a brothel, and shambles.—Abroad, the Roman dependencies, instead of commiserating their wretchedness, spurned the dominion of such abject slaves, as had *not courage* to resist the tyranny of their own legislature; invaded their territories, and routed their armies wherever they met them. But the re-assumption of their liberties, being the restoration of their happiness, their soldiers carried conquest wherever they carried arms.

It is now to be asked, in what light this resistance of the Romans against their legislature was looked on? To which I answer, that all authorities, whether ancient or modern, down to the third year of George the III^d, were so far from deeming it, agreeable to the ideas of the present days, a rebellion, that they have uniformly held it up as one of the events of Roman conduct, which has incircled them with their
BRIGHTEST GLORY.

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Natural Philosophers say, that like causes will produce like effects. By what rule of reasoning then can it be proved, that a resistance which crowned the Romans with glory, should encompass Englishmen with thorns? Are we at length reduced to this last state of mockery, by our pensioned, legislative vindicators of Parliamentary right, and supporters of English honour, and English interest?—Is there no spirit?—Is there no power amongst us? The first has been suppressed by the discouragement of true religion, and encouragement of idolatry; by countenancing all manner of dissipation, riot, prodigality, and debaucheries even in the Royal Brethren, who, during a youth spent in adultery and fornication, where cherished, honoured, and munificently supported; but the instant their understandings were ripened, and suggested the evil of their conduct, with a noble and singular virtue for those corrupt times, they looked back with horror on the courses their youth was betrayed into, and determined that their manhood and old age should be examples of real piety, virtue, and patriotism. Since which, having married two Ladies, whose deportment and characters have rendered them the ornaments of their sex, their private conduct has been highly praiseworthy, their public, highly meritorious.—How

was

was this reformation received? Every man can answer, with an endeavour to turn their holy matrimonial union into prostitution, thereby to bastardize their Issue, and in its consequence, again involve this ill-fated nation in all the blood and horror it once experienced between the Houses of York and Lancaster.—With an endeavour to disgrace them, by forbidding them the court; not knowing the disgrace would have been, in their attending such a sink of corruption. By withholding the necessary and expected assistance of money, to support their dignity; in short, nothing which could be exerted, without driving them for support and protection to the people, was omitted, in order to discourage their virtuous intentions, and bring them back to a life of dissipation, to prevent their being future objects of the people's CONSIDERATION. The Royal mercy and goodness shine here with their usual lustre, and on their accustomed objects.

By such means, has our English spirit been oppressed, and buried under an accumulation of the rankest, and foulest debaucheries, whose filthy vortex has devoured up every thing that was honest, every thing that was honourable, and every thing that was praise-worthy amongst Englishmen; a name, till the second year of

George the III^d, which involved the ideas of public and private spirit, public and private justice, public and private humanity. But now, where is the veil which will extend over the whole face of the earth, in order to cover legislative tyranny?—How shall we hide the dreadful waste of almost every thing in human shape, in the once fertile provinces of the Mogul's empire? The famines, murders, rapines of every kind, with their never failing attendant plagues, with which we depopulated whole provinces; I say, we, because those who stilled themselves the Representatives of the Commons of Great Britain, after the most perfect development of this bloody waste, voted their thanks to the diabolical author, and through him, to his coadjutorial Devils; I call them Devils, because nothing with a human heart, could have so ground down, and defaced human nature. His Majesty indeed, whose *rewards* and punishments do ever light upon the *Criminal*, and the unfortunate innocent, honoured Lord Clive with the Lord Lieutenancy of an English County; and I am informed, intends extending his Royal Goodness to General Smith, and Mr. Sykes.—But leaving those royal, and legislative objects, should we traverse the Indian, and vast Atlantic, where should we find rest, save on the slaughtered

slaughtered carcases of innocent subjects? It may be answered, the Wilds of St. Vincent's ; there we can have no views of extending oppression, the Caribs who inhabit it, living agreeably to the laws of nature, and reason ; without ambition, without avarice ; in offices of mutual aid and support ; and hospitably receiving all strangers who come peaceably amongst them. Here indeed, I should have expected relief from the horrors of the Eastern Hemisphere ; but as the Spaniards formerly boasted, that the sun never set in their dominions, so may Foreigners now say, that it never sets upon our iniquities ; for having murdered, and plundered the major part of those innocent, defenceless people, we left the rest so naked, so destitute of the indispensable necessities of life, that if it should not please the Almighty to shower down his Manna, as he did on the Jews in the Wilderness, they must waste and perish through want.

This service a Lieutenant Colonel was ordered to execute ; but as it was thought to need encouragement, (not from its danger, the inhabitants being thin, unarmed, and in every sense of the word defenceless) he was appointed upon this occasion a Major General, with a staff so very expensive, as to become a considerable and burthensome

burthensome charge upon the people of England. But enough of this. We will now solace the wearied mind amongst our own children, inhabiting the vast Continent of North America. Here we shall find peace, plenty, and happiness, flowing from the care, relief, and affection naturally extended by parents to their issue, "like the precious ointment upon the head of Aaron, which ran down his beard, even to the skirts of his clothing."

But how vain are human expectancies; the whole Continent being one scene of anarchy, distress, and civil war; thousands and ten thousands of men, women, and children, being forcibly driven, with bayonets at their throats, from their homes, lately the scenes of peace, joy, and honest industry:—Six intire Provinces, by one Act of Parliament, inhibited from fishing on their own Coasts, thereby, (with reverence I say it) repealing and making void the act of God, for the support of his creatures, by which multitudes must perish through famine, and more be reduced to the most miserable want. In short, whatever calamities men could lay upon men, we have heaped upon our American Brethren; because, say they, (with the whole profits of their Commerce given to the people of England, they will not suffer an arbitrary discre-
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tion in *our* legislature to take, or grant away *their* money, which, being earned through honest industry, by the sweat of their brows, they think in law, reason, and equity, is their property, and sole right, to the exclusion of all others; and consequently that their dominion over it is absolute, unconditional, and without controul. Whereas, should a right of disposing of this property exist out of themselves, (i. e.) in the British Parliament, the British Parliament would, in that case, be the sole Proprietors; for whoever has the absolute disposal of a thing, is absolute proprietor of that thing; consequently, the Americans would be to the Parliament of Great Britain, what the Negro Slaves are to the Planters in the West-Indies; all the earnings of those Slaves, being, in *like* manner, the property of their Masters.

But to obviate this, the Parliament say, that they *virtually* represent the Americans: the Americans, on the contrary, who *humanly* speaking, ought to be allowed to know their own representatives, say, they do not. An indifferent man says, it is a strange contest, wherein a mother shall not be allowed to know her own children, or those whom by *consent*, or acquiescence she may adopt as such; this, which in theory would
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be the extreme of ridicule, in practice, becomes the extreme of cruelty.

But say the King's friends, are not the non-electors of Great Britain in the very predicament of the Americans? To which, I answer, that no two situations can be more opposite; for the voluntary sufferance, acquiescence, and custom of the non-electors, whilst they continue them, (which I presume they will do, as long as they find themselves *equitably* treated) is by all Jurists held to be a consent, which consent, sufferance, and custom, (alone) give the binding force to law; consequently, it may with propriety be said, that they bind themselves. Whereas, the Americans, by withholding their consent, (if they are allowed to be intitled to the rights of nature in common with Englishmen) are as well by the spirit as letter of this very Act, absolved from all obedience to any legislature, save that, that they elect, or give their consent, or sufferance to. And in conformity with this, is the great Hooker, where he says, "sith men naturally have no full, and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men; therefore, utterly without our consent, we could in such sort, be at no man's commandment living; and to be commanded we do consent, when that society, whereof we are a part, hath at
 " any

“any time before consented, *without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement.*”

The islands of Jersey, Guernsey, Sark, and Alderney, are governed by their own laws, and not by the laws of England; because,—as Sir Matthew Hale says, “they are not parcels of the realm of England.” Hence, according to this great lawyer, the legislative acts of Great Britain do only bind the people of the realm. Why?—Because it only represents these people. and this is in perfect agreement with the declaratory act before cited. But if those islands were in the realm, their freeholders and freemen, like those of the Isle of Wight, being part of the realm, would elect their own representatives to the High Court of Parliament; and then would be governed, as every Briton is, by a British legislature of his own chusing.

If those then are the acknowledged and accustomed rights and liberties of the people of Jersey, Guernsey, &c. &c. is it not to be marvelled at, that any can be found so foolish or so wicked, as to deny the existence of similar rights in the Americans? a people, who for numbers, wealth, and power, do exceedingly surpass those islanders; yet it is every day done under the idea of a virtual representation, that is a creature without a creator, an elected by a

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non-electors; an absurdity too gross for imposition under any reign, save that of his Canadian Holiness. But his Sacred Majesty (for he is this too) with his Right Reverend and Reverend Benches, together with the King's friends, have so happily extended our faith, that by it we remove all difficulties, such as the former idea of the incompetency of a Protestant Parliament to elect a branch of itself to be a Romish Pope, at the same time retaining its Protestant capacity.

But leaving this, we will turn our eyes to objects, in those times of danger and impending ruin, alone worthy our consideration. We will descend into the *sanctum sanctorum* of English liberties, unfold its doors, and lay open its sacred recesses: by which we will see that the supreme power ever was, and still is, in the people at large; and that our present form of government, or legislature, is but a form and creature of the people, made or suffered for their conveniency, and existing at their discretion, to carry on their good.—We will see that the different branches of this legislature have been permitted to exercise different powers not derived from itself, but the people at large, and therefore cannot abrogate or exercise them in its collected or united state.

Thus

Thus one branch executes the laws made by the whole; another determines finally in cases of judicature; the third, being the Commons, provide and grant the supplies. To the investigation of this last power I shall for the present confine myself, as it will fully manifest, how constitutionally grounded Lord Chatham's assertion is, "that there is an essential difference between taxation and legislation; as the former can only be exercised by the people's immediate representatives, or Commons, to the exclusion of the other branches, because they alone are entrusted with that power. From whence it will also necessarily follow, that the Americans cannot be rightfully and constitutionally taxed by the British legislature, or High Court of Parliament, and therefore will also affirm another assertion of that great statesman's, viz.—"that we have no right under Heaven, to tax the Americans."

Tacitus speaking of our Saxon ancestors, says, "De minoribus rebus principes consultant, de majoribus omnes, ita tamen ut ea quoque: Quorum penes plebem arbitrium est, apud principes pertractentur." And upon this bottom stands that famous law saying of ours, "Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbatur." What affects all, should be approved by all.

The noble historian having before said that matters of small account were left to the Princes, but those of any moment were determined by the whole body of the people, the Princes or magistrates being present.

And such were the liberties enjoyed by our ancestors, that the same author says, though they met on certain days,—“the new and full moon, yet they could not be *compelled* to assemble;” consequently, their meetings must have been voluntary. Such as in those days are the meetings of the Americans, or the freeholders, to take the sense of the county upon any public measure. In those councils they tried and determined causes, and inflicted fines and punishments, even to death; they elected their princes, or rather principals or magistrates, for every village and district, to each of whom they joined, as his council and authority, one hundred, chosen also from amongst themselves, to administer the laws. “*Eliguntur in iisdem conciliis & principes, qui jura per pagos vicosque reddunt, centeni singulis ex plebe comites, consilium simul & auctoritas, adfunt.*” But with respect to the support of their princes or government, which in our modern phrase is called the supplies, he says, “the custom was, for the people of the commonwealth,

“wealth, individually, to give of their own accord, either of their cattle or grain, which, though it was a supply for their wants, yet it was received as an honor or favor.” Hence the thanks of our Kings for the supplies granted by the people. “*Mos est civitatibus ultro ac viritim conferre principibus vel armentorum, vel frugum, quod pro honore acceptum, etiam necessitatibus subvenit.*” Afterwards, he says, they gave money.

From which it must appear, that as the supplies were granted by the individual at his own discretion, and received by the Prince as an honor and favor done him, it consequently could not have been a legislative act, which leaves nothing to the discretion of the individual.

Besides, Tacitus had before enumerated the different acts and powers of this national council, or Wittena Gemot, all which were confined to matters of war and peace, making of rules for the good conduct of citizen to citizen, trying of causes, and electing princes or magistrates, and their council. Hence we are authorised to assert, upon the best and only foundation---INDISPUTABLE FACTS---that in the time of our Saxon ancestors, whose government is the platform of our present one, legislation and taxation were essentially different, and that the latter

latter did in no wise belong to, or issue from the former.

After the union of the different Saxon governments under a christian monarch those Wittena Gemots were continued; and under William I. were called Parliaments, from the members speaking their minds, the old French word signifying that. Sir Henry Spelman mentions one summoned by King Ethelbert, ann. 605, which he calls *Commune Concilium* tam cleri quam populi; a Common Council of the clergy and *people*: and another held by King Ina in 712, wherein were made ecclesiastical laws concerning marriage, &c. and other things, ad concordiam publicam promovendam per *Commune Concilium* & assensum omnium episcoporum, & principum, procerum, comitum, & omnium *sapientum* seniorum & *populorum totius* Regni, i. e. to advance the public concord by the *Common Council* and assent of all the Bishops, Princes, great men, Counts, and *all the wise old men* and *people* of the *whole* kingdom.

And Bede, in his Ecclesiastical History, says, " that the grand league and union between the Britons, Saxons and Picts was concluded and confirmed, per *Commune Concilium* & assensum omnium episcoporum, procerum, comitum & omnium

omnium sapientum seniorum & *populorum*, & per præceptum Regis Ina; i. e. By the *Common Council* and assent of all the bishops, great men, counts, and all the wise old men and *people*, and by the precept of King Ina.

William of Malmfbury, called the Wittena Gemot,—“ A general senate and convention “ of the *people*.”

Sir Henry Spelman, “ a convention of the “ princes and bishops, magistrates and *freemen* “ of the kingdom, to consult about the com- “ mon safety; of war and peace, and to ad- “ vance the public utility.”

And Camden says, “ that what the Saxons “ formerly called a Wittena Gemot, we call a “ Parliament.”

Lambard de priscis Anglor. Legibus, says, “ that Edward the Confessor confirmed the an- “ cient Saxon laws, and that new ones were “ added by the King, Barons, and *people*.”

Pictavinus, Ordericus Vital, Hoveden, Malmfbury, Spelman, Selden, &c. do all say, “ that “ William, the Bastard of Normandy was, upon “ his declaring that he would observe the laws “ of Saint Edward, elected King, a clero & “ *populo*, by the clergy and *people*. That he “ afterwards confirmed this by a solemn oath “ before the altar of the Lord, and passed a “ charter

“charter of the ancient liberties, one chapter
 “of which is,—*Volumus etiam ac firmiter*
 “*præcipimus & concedimus, ut omnes liberi*
 “*homines totius Monarchiæ Regni nostri præ-*
 “*dicti, habeant & teneant terras suas, and pos-*
 “*sessiones suas, bene & in pace, libere ab omnes*
 “*exactione injusta, & ab omni tallagio.* Ita quod
 “*nihil ab eis exigatur vel capiatur, nisi servi-*
 “*tium suum liberum quod de jure nobis facere*
 “*debent & facere tenentur; & prout statutum*
 “*est eis & illis a nobis datum & concessum, jure*
 “*hæreditario imperpetuum, per Commune Conci-*
 “*lium totius Regni nostri prædicti.*” This law
 then being made by the Common Council of
 the whole kingdom, was the great charter of
 William I. which was confirmed by Henry I.
 Stephen, Henry II. and King John, who says,
 “*Nullum scutagium vel auxilium ponam in*
 “*Regno nostro, nisi per Commune Consilium*
 “*Regni nostri*” i. e. No escuage or aid shall be
 laid in our kingdom, but by the *Common Coun-*
 cil of our kingdom; being the same in sub-
 stance with the great charter of William I. and
 all being but a declaration of the ancient com-
 mon law and right of the kingdom, and no
 new law, or forced upon any of those princes,
 or King John. So says Matthew Paris, who
 was Historiographer Royal to King Henry III.
 and

and lived in the time of King John, in the fifteenth year of whose reign, that is, two years before the passing of Magna Charta at Runningmead, *for the first time*, were issued two distinct writs for calling the people to give their counsel and aid. The record saith, that the King, being in partibus transmarinis, writes,

Majori & Baronibus London

Majori & probis hominibus

Winton Exon.

Northampt. Worcest.

Lincoln Cantebr.

Ebor. Hunt.

Oxon. Bristol

Glouc. Norwich

Heref.*

and all the great boroughs of the demesnes of the King, giving them an account of his proceedings and successes in war; and that the Pope had, by his letters, released the interdict, under which the kingdom lay; which letters the King had sent to Peter, Bishop of Winton, Chief Justice of England, and therefore desired that they would believe what the Bishop would say to them, that consilium & auxilium vestrum

* Rot. Pat. 15, Joh. pars. 2, m. 2.

ad honorem nostrum, & vestrum, & statum Regni nostri in melius, communicandum efficaciter super hoc apponatis, teste apud Rupellam, 6 die Martii.

The second writ he directed to the Earl Marshall, and to all the Barons, & Magnatibus Angliæ, &c. teste apud Rupellam, 8 die Martii.*

This great record (as indeed are all the others before-mentioned for the same reason) is highly worthy our most serious consideration. First, as it shews our constitution to be similar to the old Wittena Gemot of our Saxon ancestors, as described by Tacitus; wherein *every individual freeman* of the land had, in *his own person*, a right to come to those assemblies; and to deliberate, assent to, or dissent from any measure therein proposed; wherefore if all did not go, it was, first, because they thought it would be unnecessary, as there would be assembled a sufficient number to take care of the common concern, their resolutions including themselves equally with the *voluntary* absentees; and next, because it would have been exceedingly inconvenient for every individual freeman to leave his business, in order to go a great way from home, to deliberate upon that which he

* Rot. Pat. 15. Joh. pars 2, m. 1.

was satisfied, would be as carefully and as well done in his absence, by those who would be present. Hence it is evident, that every individual freeholder and freeman had a right, and, in consequence, was summoned to be present at those assemblies, as well in the times of our Norman as Saxon ancestors.

This record is again worthy our consideration, as it differs from all that went before, because it mentions two writs for assembling the people, one directed to those whom we now call Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the other to the Commons at large, whereas, before there was but one writ, in which was inserted all the different orders of freemen. Hence it necessarily follows, that in the 15th year of King John, i. e. in the year 1214 of our Lord, the people were first separated by writ into two distinct bodies, and thereby laid the ground-plots upon which, in after times, were built our two Houses of Parliament. But to return to the particular business of taxation, inter communia Hilar. 17. E. 3. penes rememoratorem domini Regis in scaccario, it appears in a plea between the King and the Prior of Coventry, that 29 & 32 H. 3. *Quedam subsidia per magnates & communitatem Regni spontanea & mera voluntate Regi concessa*, i. e. that in the 29th and

3d Hen. III. the great men and commonalty *spontaneously*, and of *their meer will*, bestowed certain subsidies to the King. So they gave in the time mentioned by Tacitus, with this difference, that in latter days the grants became moulded into a more regular form, and in ours the thing itself, i. e. the money not being delivered in what is called the grant of supplies to the Crown, but only a right over, and power to levy such supplies for the purposes mentioned; it evidently follows, that the King must of necessity approve of this gift before he can make use of it; because his disapprobation would annihilate the grant, and as his silence amounts to a disapprobation, he is therefore (in order to use it) under a natural necessity of giving his assent, which he does by thanking the Commons who offer it; which thanks instantly converts, in *appearance*, that which before was a spontaneous and free grant, into a statute of Parliament. But that this conversion is only apparent, and the subsidy not an act of legislation, is evident, from the right and power to levy the money being in the King (*provided he does not reject it*) the instant the bill or grant is presented to him; his thanks being but a grateful acknowledgement for the voluntary gift of the people, such thanks
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at the same time denoting his consent, which has been shewn to be absolutely necessary, to prevent the loss of the grant; because the King's silence in the High Court of Parliament, to all bills and grants, are by custom construed into a disapprobation. Wherefore I presume, that the not carefully distinguishing the reality of the grant, from the appearance it afterwards assumes, have led many candid, well-intentioned gentlemen into an opinion, that taxation and legislation are one and the same.

And as I am upon this subject, I cannot pass it without remarking, that this error of mistaking appearances for realities, has been the source of endless and mighty calamities to mankind. Under Tiberius, the forms of the Roman government being kept up, many citizens believed that the constitution itself was unimpaired, notwithstanding the butcheries which every day deluged their streets with the blood of the innocent. At present we have, as in former times, a High Court of Parliament, we have juries, habeas corpus, and representatives of our own choosing, except in cases wherein those whom we have already chosen, may declare us incompetent to make a further choice, and therefore will not permit us, but make the election themselves. This last
indeed

indeed, seems to destroy even the appearance before mentioned; but it may be said in answer, that it was never done but once, which was in the commencement of this reign of the best of Princes, and therefore should be looked upon only as an exception to the general rule. Besides that, the people must chuse forty members, so many being necessary to make a House of Commons, before such House can proceed to elect the remaining five hundred and eighteen members. But with respect to its being done but once, it may be replied, that the House having repeatedly refused reprobating the measure, by erasing from their journals the former resolution regarding the county of Middlesex, they have approved the precedent, and thereby, as far as in them lay, established a right in the first forty members who may meet upon a general election, to reject every other representative chosen by the people, and in their room elect so many more. Hence, as long as this resolution is allowed to be a law of Parliament, which necessarily must be, as long as it stands upon the Journals of the House of Commons, the right of election becomes divided; the people chusing forty, which being a House, may, according to the law of Parliament, elect the remaining 518 to fill up their own body. But that

that they will not use this right immediately, I will admit, there being *times and seasons* for all things. However, it must be allowed, that much has already been done in establishing the precedent, as no man, whose comprehension is not below that of a brute, will suppose it has been done and supported for nothing—the ostensible object being long out of the question.

Hence we see that a law of Parliament, instead of being the law of the land, or a rule of right, may be a law of tyranny, which I presume none but Jacobites and Tories will say,—can be the *lex terræ* of England. And if to what has been said we add a former bribed majority, the existence of which no body did then doubt, who considered the places, pensions, reversions, contracts, lotteries, expectancies, &c. &c. that were given to create such majority, there will remain no doubt of their having been the servants of the Crown, and therefore only the apparent representatives of the people, which being taken for the reality, met the support of all those who unhappily were under the delusion, and consequently an idea of omnipotence, with a right to do what they pleased, was conceived.

Wherefore the Minister only applied for their services; and what they did sanctify you
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may infer as well from what has been said, as from the late wastings, burnings, and dreadful carnage committed on the other side of the Atlantic: there thousands of our brave fellow-subjects, who but the other day enjoyed all the sweets of domestic felicity, now, alas! lie with their bodies bare, bloody, and mangled, upon the cold ground, like common carrion, a prey to dogs, to vultures, and to worms; a horrid spectacle! but how infinitely more so, when to our sight is presented fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, and wives, sadly, though piously, employed in gathering up the shattered and dispersed limbs of their sons, brothers, and husbands, then joining them to their slaughtered trunks in order to make up a miserable whole, upon which they may throw their more miserable selves, embrace the bloody corpse, and bathe it in their tears.

But enough of this: We will therefore return to, and further illustrate the business of taxation. In the thirty-eighth year of Henry III. that king being, according to the record, “in partibus transmarinis,” and the Queen left regent, she sent writs in the King’s name, directed, “Archiepiscopis, Episcopis, Abbatibus, Prioribus, Comitibus, Baronibus, militibus, liberis hominibus, civibus & burgensibus terræ suæ

suæ Hiberniæ, telling them that “Mittimus fratrem Nicholaum de Sancta Neoto, fratrem hospitii Sancti Johannis Jerusalem, in Anglia, ad partes Hiberniæ ad exponendum vobis (together with J. Fitz. Geffery, the King’s Justice) the state of his land of Vascony,* endangered by the hostile invasion of the King of Castile, quæ nullo jure, sed potentia sua confisus, terram nostram Vasconiæ per ipsius fortitudinem a manibus nostris auferre & a dominio Regni Anglia, segregare proponit, and therefore universitatim vestram quanta possumus affectione rogantes, quatenus nos & jura nostra totaliter indefensa, non deserentes nobis in tanto periculo, quantumcunque poteritis de gente, & pecunia subveniatis, which would turn to their everlasting honor; concluding his nostris angustis taliter compatiētes quod nos & heredes nostri vobis & heredibus vestris sumus non immerito obligati. Teste Reginae & R. comite Curnubiæ, apud Windesor, 17 die Februarii. Per Reginam.

Hence it is evident that this writ for calling the first Commune Concilium, or Parliament, in Ireland, was directed to every body in that kingdom, from the Archbishops down to the lowest freeman; setting before them the hostile in-

Rot. Pat. 38, H. 3. 4 Hibernia.

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vasion upon his lands of Vascony, and praying that they would not leave him defenceless, or desert him in so perilous a situation, but grant him an aid of men and money, which he said would turn to their everlasting honor; and that their compassionating him in this manner, would confer a mighty obligation upon him and his heirs.

This record is of great import, and will much elucidate the business of taxation. By the address it appears to be taken, word for word, from the old writs, for calling the Commune Concilium, or Parliament of England, consequently is founded upon that platform; wherefore the forms of both constitutions (with the rights of all men being the same) we must necessarily pronounce both people with one common King (which by compact the people of England alone have a right to chuse) to be in all legislative points upon a perfect equality, except in those wherein the Irish legislature have, from time to time, made alterations. But this power of altering can never affect the supremacy of England, in appointing a common King for both countries; because their right is founded upon a compact that cannot be dissolved without their own act, which I flatter myself will never happen. And if we look into the nature
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of this supremacy, we will find it amply sufficient, not only to prevent any act hurtful to to this country passing in that, but also to give a tendency and operation to all their acts which shall ultimately terminate in the good of England. For if the King is considered and treated according to what he really is, that is, chosen by the people to be their first magistrate to carry on their good, it will evidently follow, that he must act by their advice: and as no Irish Bill can be passed into a law without his consent, he may withhold it until his granting it would be for the common good of both people. Which common good I hope neither legislature will ever lose sight of, the interests of both kingdoms being so naturally and closely interwoven as to create a consensus in all their parts, consequently the wounding of one becomes the injury of all. Wherefore, for their mutual security, I do from my soul wish, that by an equitable and fair union, they may be made one and the same people.

Now as the before-mentioned writ was the first that ever was issued for calling a Commune Concilium, or Parliament, in Ireland, and as it is in all things similar to those issued for assembling the people of England, it must be evident that the freeholders and freemen, or to mo-

dernize the phrase, the Parliaments of both countries were considered, with respect to the business of granting aid and support, whether of men or money, as totally and absolutely distinct and independent the one of the other. For no man but a fool will suppose, that if the sole right to grant the properties of both countries was in the English Commune Concilium, that they would have suffered any other body of people to have usurped it, and grant away that which they only had a right to do; and this at a time when the mode and precedent made the platform of the Irish constitution, consequently to be looked upon as sacred through all succeeding ages. And if it be further considered, that King Henry omitted nothing in this writ by which he could move the people of Ireland to commiserate his situation, in order to stimulate them to grant his prayer for men and money, it must be evident, first, that this grant must have been their sole act, and consequently not an act of legislation: And again, that the King did not think he had any other constitutional mode of getting this aid, but by the voluntary gift of the people upon whom it was to be levied.

There appears another record, Rot. Pat. 28 Edw. I. that magnates & *probi homines terræ Hiberniæ* quintam decimam partem de bonis & catallis

catallis suis concefferunt *gratiose* to the King. Now that those Probi Homines, who joined in this voluntary grant of a fifteenth of their goods and chattels, were the *common freeholders and freemen*, will be evident, from the citizens of Dublin being styled by Henry III. Probi Homines nostri Dublyn. Rot. Claus. 7 H. III. dorso.

Hence it is evident, that the constitutional mode of taxation in Ireland, was the same as that in England, that is, the Irish freeholders and freemen, in Commune Concilium, or Parliament, of their meer will, voluntarily granted aids to the Crown out of their own property, in like manner as the English did in their Parliament; and so it has continued to this day, with this difference, that formerly they gave in person, whereas now they are content to give by deputation. And as the Irish freeholders and freemen of former times were almost all Englishmen, it clearly follows that they did not forfeit their birth-rights by going to settle abroad, but in this material business of taxation, possessed and used those rights in as full and ample a manner in Ireland, as their brethren the English freeholders and freemen did in England. Now if Englishmen going to Ireland carried their rights with them, why not going to America, particularly as the charters
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of American English express that they shall enjoy all the rights of Englishmen? Who then will have the effrontery, in the face of all those venerable authorities, to assert,—that Englishmen, freeholders, and freemen of America, are of right subject to be taxed by any man, or body of men under Heaven, *save themselves*.

In the 49th year of Henry III. were issued the *first* writs for electing *two* Knights, two Citizens, Burgeffes and Barons for the Cinque Ports, to represent the Commons in Parliament. Thus began our present mode of returning two members. But whoever will attend to what went before, will find that the conveniency and consent of the people suggested a convention by representation, and that it was practised, though in another manner from the beginning—as those who did not chuse to attend were satisfied and content with what was done by those who did attend.

We will now descend with the usage of Parliaments, in matters of taxation, to the year 1764, by which we will find that the ancient right of Englishmen, to give their property according to their own pleasure, has been ever understood *solely* to reside in themselves.

For a long time the King's tenants in ancient demesne were not taxed by Parliament, because
they

they were liable to give the King a tallage, *ratione tenuræ*, according to their tenures, and were free from all other taxes. But when Edward I. exceeded the just demands, those tenants considered his exactions as intolerable, and would no longer pay, but got it remedied by the statute, *de tallagio non concedendo* Edward I. Now as the best authorities say, that the tenants in ancient demesne were constitutionally exempted from being taxed by Parliament, *because* they were taxed by another mode: Why should not the Americans be equally and constitutionally exempted, *even* for the very same reason, *because* they are taxed by another mode, viz.—*in their General Assembly?*

All those who held under the Saxon governments, in frank almoign, or free alms, were exempted from all civil charges or taxes by Parliament.

Tenants who held by Knight service, in the Norman times, were also exempt from Parliamentary taxation, *because* they taxed themselves apart. But as they joined to obtain the statute *de tallagio*, &c. they afterwards taxed themselves in Common in Parliament. From all which it must appear how essentially different taxation is from legislation. And that it should be no longer doubted, I will mention a case directly

rectly in point, which is the conduct of all the estates of the realm on the business of taxation.

In the 25th year of Edward I. a Parliament was called at St. Edmondsbury, when the King demanded a subsidy, but the clergy refusing to contribute, withdrew from Parliament, and went to their separate homes; the consequence was, that they were not taxed, though the laity were. Now had it been an act of legislation, it would have comprehended *all*, and the assent of the clergy would have been immaterial, as appears by the different laws passed in this very parliament, particularly a confirmation of Magna Charta, as mentioned in the statute books. But if it is further considered that this refusal and retiring of the clergy was voluntary, and that it only exempted them from being taxed; it will be tantamount to a full declaration of every branch of the legislature, not only that taxation and legislation are totally distinct, but also that the High Court of Parliament, or legislature, is constitutionally incompetent to lay any tax, having no sort of business with it. And further, that the rightful power of levying a tax must solely arise out of the voluntary grant, or voluntary sufferance or consent of the people who are to pay the tax. Now as the Americans have not consented, or will suffer themselves to be
taxed

taxed by any, save themselves in their general assemblies, it necessary follows, that constitutionally they cannot be taxed by any other mode. So stood the English Constitution down to the third year of George III^d, the statute de tallagio, and the great law it was founded upon, not being repealed.

The cases of Calais, Wales, Chester, and Durham, corroborate all that went before, and only furnish us with more recent instances than those already mentioned; the first was not taxed until it sent representatives to the House of Commons, we may say as much for the others, as the Parliaments held in the 27th, and 35th of Henry the VIIIth, and the Durham act of Charles the II^d. reprobated as unconstitutional and unjust, the mode of binding counties, and districts by laws which they did not consent to, and therefore enacted statutes, to prevent their being liable to such violences for the future, by granting their freeholders, and freemen, the right of sending representatives to the High Court of Parliament, which they did not formerly do, having been anciently governed by their own peculiar laws; the two latter having had their Commune Concilium, or Parliaments in each county; the Earl presided at Chester, the Bishop at Durham, in like manner as the King did in the Parliament

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of England; and in those early, and constitutional times, the acts of the latter did not extend to the former, (see King's Vale Royal of England) though their Earls and Bishops constituted a part of it; wherefore, if the lately ridiculous, but now mischievous plea of virtual representation, could have been at any time, with but a shew of equity adopted, it must have been when the Lords of Marches in Wales, the Earls of Chester, and Bishops of Durham, sat in the Common Council of the Kingdom, as the tenants in those countries, held under them; but that no such thing was ever thought of, may be seen as well by the supplication to Henry the VIth, as by the statutes just mentioned; the latter part of the preamble of one of those Acts, (which is similar to the other) acknowledging, that the inhabitants of the county palatine of Chester, "for
 " lack of representation in the High Court of
 " Parliament, have been oftentimes touched and
 " grieved with acts and statutes made within
 " the said court, as well derogatory unto the
 " most ancient jurisdictions, liberties, and pri-
 " vileges of the said county palatine, as preju-
 " dicial unto the common-wealth, quietness,
 " rest, and peace of the subjects inhabiting with-
 " in the same." This was the act of a great and candid legislature, that did not, *like tyrants,*
 measure

measure their right by their power; but like just law-givers, their power *by their right*; so that amongst them, we may truly say, “mercy and truth met together, righteousness and peace kissed each other.” But of legislatures within our memory, “destruction and unhappiness is in their ways, and the way of peace have they not known: there being *no fear* of God before their eyes.” The next verse is, “have they no knowledge that they are such workers of mischief, *eating up* my people as it were bread, and *call not* upon the Lord?”

Now if we take a view of the precedent matter, the sum will be,

THAT the people are the original of all power, and all property; that the great body of *English freeholders*, and *freemen*, have ever retained an absolute dominion over both; but that during *their pleasure*, and for their good, they have chosen certain representatives, by whom part of this power and property is to be drawn forth as occasions shall seem meet; first to the delegates, but *finally* to the people at large, in order to encrease and perpetuate the public felicity; consequently, the High Court of Parliament so far from being absolute, unconditional, and without controul, is the *meer creature* and *dependent* of the people

at large, *created* by their breath, and *existing* by their will, which being withdrawn, leaves not a phantom behind.

—THAT legislation, and taxation are totally, and essentially distinct; the latter being, as we have seen, nothing more than the operation of the bounty of the *people* to the King: whereas the former is the operation of the *three* legislative branches, making rules for the good government of King and people.

—THAT Englishmen emigrating to foreign parts, wherein they become freeholders, and freemen, holding immediately under a common King, (whom the freeholders, and freemen within the realm of England ever had, and still have the sole right of electing) are intitled to all the rights and privileges of their brethren residing within the realm, save the particular one mentioned, which they themselves have consented to be local, and where it is, as well by their oaths of allegiance, as acceptance of their tenures.

—THAT an essential right of these, is an absolute dominion over their own property, which they therefore possess in as full and perfect a manner in America, and Ireland, as in England; consequently, it can only be disposed of *by themselves in person*, or by representatives of
their

their own *choosing*, or with their consent, or voluntary sufferance.

Therefore, as the Americans say, they did not return any one member to the House of Commons of Great Britain, or ever consented to be represented by the said House; but on the contrary, agreeably to the nature of their freeholds, and freedom, elected their own representatives in their different Houses of Assembly, it must be evident, that the latter only are entrusted by them with the right of granting portions of their property; hence it follows, that the pretended right of the Commons of Great Britain, to grant away the earnings and possessions of their brethren, the Commons of America, is unconstitutional, arbitrary, and in direct violation of one of the most fundamental and important rights of Englishmen; and as all supplies by our constitution, are to proceed from the voluntary grants of the people, whose property is granted,* any other mode of raising such supplies,

* See the message of Lords and Commons, to Richard the III^d, upon his answer to their address; part of it I shall transcribe. “ Sir, the Prelates, Lords, and whole people
“ of the Commons of England, after several loyal and
“ honest wishes, intimate these things unto you, that they
“ have it confirmed by ancient constitution, which none
“ can

plies, is by the common, and statute law of the land, deemed illegal, and within the realm of England, would be a tyranny of the most intolerable species; wherefore, if our late, unplaced, unpensioned, bloodless Parliaments, had not passed acts for the purpose of raising a revenue in America, out of American Property, we might have asserted from the immemorial customs of the people, the usage and statutes of Parliaments, as well as the rights of property, persons, and things, that neither the revenue acts, or those dreadful ones which followed them, could have been formed by a British Parliament, *without violating* every thing hitherto held sacred by Britons.

Here

“can contradict.” They then declare some of their rights, and conclude the paragraph with saying, and they conceive also, “that since they are to support the public charge, *they* should have the ordering, and supervisal too, *how, and by whom their* goods and fortunes are expended.”

Here then is a full, and express declaration of the Prelates, Lords, and whole people of the Commons of England, that those who support the public charge, i. e. those out of whose goods and fortunes the supplies are raised, should have the ordering, and supervisal too, how, and by whom such goods and fortunes, or, in the modern phrase, supplies, are expended. What will our pensioned, prostitute, miserable theorists say against this? Is it not a most clear, and solemn judgement, or opinion of the whole people of England, in direct opposition to the present mode of taxing the Americans?

Here we are naturally led to investigate the justice, policy, and utility of the American revenue bill; the King's friends, in support of it, say,—that as England expended millions in the defence and extension of her Colonies, it is but reasonable that she should be re-paid; that the Mother Country is loaded with taxes, and therefore should be assisted by an offspring she had treated so kindly: all which is granted by the opposers of the bill, as well on this, as the other side of the Atlantic. Who further say, that the millions mentioned, have been for some time past discharged, as must be evident from the indisputable facts laid before the House of Commons, which proved, that the export trade of England to the Colonies, and their dependencies, have grown to the amazing sum of six millions and twenty-four thousand pounds per annum, which is within four hundred eighty-five thousand pound of the whole trade of England, in 1704, and above one third of it, in 1772, a medium year; that the general trade in other parts, has also increased from five million nine hundred forty thousand and seventy pounds to nine millions nine hundred seventy-six thousand, which makes the encrease of exports to those parts to be four millions thirty-five thousand nine hundred and thirty pounds.

Now

Now as every man conversant in our American imports, and the circulatory nature of the whole trade, must know, that this increase is principally caused by that trade, we may with great truth assert, that our commerce with America, constitutes more than the half of all we carry on with the whole World*. How this has finally operated

* It was proved before the House of Commons, that the exports from Great Britain to North America, the West India Islands, and Africa, with the re-exportation of North American and West India commodities, amounted to 8,500,000 pounds, which is half a million more than the half of the whole amount of our trade. See the examination before the House, and Mr. Glover's remarks, whereby he shews, that the exports from England alone, in 1772, a medium of three years, to North America, and her dependencies in trade, amounted to 5,500,000 pounds, that is to the first 3,500,000, to the West Indies, 1,300,000, and to Africa, 700,000 pounds; that of the imports from the two first, 1,000,000 was exported to foreign Countries, and 2,000,000, to Ireland, the whole exports, and re-exports making 8,500,000 pounds.

To the exports of England, Mr. Burke adds those of Scotland, and thereby makes both, exclusive of there-exports, amount to 6,024,000 pounds.

It was also proved before the House, that the West Indian, an African trades must be totally lost, unless supported by the middle Colonies of North America. See the examinations. Doctor Tucker indeed seems to be of another opinion; But as we do not hold that *inspiration* conveys any knowledge of, or has any concern with mercantile affairs, we must re-
ject

operated here, we shall learn from the rise of
rents, the increased years of purchase upon
I lands,

ject as well the reveries as *fabrications* of this political divine; for though the saying of the Apostle, viz. "that his "servants they are, whom they obey," may afford a strong presumption that the Dean of Gloucester has more to do with George the III^d, than with the Holy Spirit, yet my Christian readers, (however uncourtly) cannot, without being charged with impiety, give his Reverence more credit, or competency, upon this account.

As to Canadian resources, the idea is ridiculous. For not to mention the vast additional expence, precariousness and uncertainty of this mode of supply, from the prodigious distance, and the navigation through the river St. Lawrence, that is frozen up above six months in the year;—Not to mention that there are not sufficient supplies in this country, or if there were, are there hands sufficient to provide them;—Not to mention, that the Canadian corn could not be furnished at proper seasons, because of the river being so long frozen, which interruption, would create an absolute famine in the West Indies, as the Indian corn will not keep above three, and the flour above two months in those Islands;—Not to mention all those, some of them, insurmountable difficulties, we must suppose, that Canada will confederate with the twelve Colonies, or be conquered by them; if the former are not conquered by England. What prospect there is of this, let the Blockade of twelve thousand of the King's troops at Boston declare.

By the Provincials possessing Crown Point, and Ticonderago, with the batteaus of the Lake, they have all Canada open to them, which must make them masters of their
own

lands, the improvement of the soil and habitations, the stock, jewels, plate, money, goods and furniture; in short, the individual wealth, which every where strikes the eye, altogether forming an opulence astonishing even to the possessors. So that we may with great moderation assert, that the value of this country has been doubled, within the periods mentioned. I think it was Sir Isaac Newton, who estimated the fee simple of all the lands of England, at three hundred millions; they must now surely make twice that sum: so that if we throw aside all the other advantages, we shall here find an increase of three hundred millions to the national wealth; something more than one third of which we will only say was gotten from the Americans. From which, if we subtract the debt contracted in their defence, it will leave a balance in their favour, and against us, of above

own terms over that country. Again, because the Canadians are exceedingly dissatisfied with the Quebec Bill, which, they say, has made absolute slaves of them, and their posterity. Of this, I am myself, fully convinced, it being evidently so proved, in a pamphlet published for Kearsly, intitled, A Letter to Sir William Merideth, Bart. in answer to his late Letter to the Earl of Chatham, upon the Quebec Bill.

bove sixty millions.—But should we make an impartial estimate, there would not remain a doubt of England's being benefited by America to the amount of one hundred millions, over and above her expences for that country.

Thus have they triply repaid the money, we say, we expended for them. And with respect to the future ease of the Mother Country, they answer, first, that the taxes are kept up in order to encrease the power of the Crown, by creating and multiplying it's creatures in both Houses; notwithstanding which, they would freely give, according to their abilities, through the medium of their assemblies; and also that they, the Americans, were, and still are well inclined to contribute to the full as much as the people of England, by continuing their former lucrative commerce; which they further say, must grow with their growth; and if the past time will authorise them to judge of the future, in twenty, or thirty years more, they will give to the amount of the whole of the present national expences; and all the conditions they insist on are, that we shall receive this in the most beneficial way to ourselves, that is, that it come through the medium of our labourers, manufacturers, merchants, seamen, farmers, and land lords. Thus pervading with a regular and equable motion,

every individual of the realm,—The realm itself, (like a sound body, whose heart circulates the blood through every, the most minute vessel, throws off the peccant humours, and with wholesome juices nourishes all the parts) becomes so strengthened and invigorated, that it will be enabled to make the most extraordinary exertions, and repel every attack, *save* that which should turn the current of its supply. But how should this be repelled, when the powers of repulsion are withdrawn? Trade to a great commercial nation is, what the sinews and muscles of the body are to the animal frame, which being cut, there remains to the languid carcase only a convulsive motion, which finally tends to accelerate the discharge of the little vigour remaining in the body, and thereby brings on a total dissolution. Whether this, in great part, is our miserable case at present, I willingly leave to the consideration of others.

Now if trade is so essential to this country,—If it encreases the value of our lands,—If it encreases the number of our people,—If it diffuses plenty, wealth, and happiness through the whole realm, and if from all these arise mighty power, as well to secure as increase and perpetuate those blessings; who that has a wish for the continuance of this public felicity, or rather, who that does
not

not with its destruction, would stake all upon the (at best) uncertain event of war? And this from the hope of the more immediate drawing a miserable pittance of this late supply, thro the Exchequer. I call it miserable, only as compared to the commercial whole, for in any other view, it will be found ample enough to answer the purposes of raising the crown above the dependence upon the people, and thereby make it absolute, and them slaves. To obviate this, the King's friends say, that the tax is to be levied by the authority of Parliament, and not of the Crown, as is done in this country; and that the intention is to apply it to the national exigencies, that is, towards lightening the burdens of the people.—That this will be done, we can have no sort of doubt, when we consider the enormous pensions granted to Governors Bernard, Hutchinson, Sir John Blaquiere, and that eighteen hundred pounds per annum were given to purchase Mr. Jenkinson the patent place of Clerk of the Pells, in Ireland; these, it will be said, are strange significations of the Royal intention to lighten the burdens of the people; as also are the pensions, and newly created places, granted to buffoons, fiddlers and gamblers, through the recommendation of that most capital, and mischievous of all buffoons, the scandalous
 filcher

filcher of the immortal Wolfe's reputation, afterwards Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.—If to those are added the fresh grants to Sir John Blaquiere, the variety of burthenfome, and before unheard-of officers *without* offices, a strange creation unknown to all governments, save this œconomical one; as also the multiplication of taxes in Ireland, the continuance of all the war taxes in time of peace in England, with the expensiture of five hundred thousand pounds over and above what the Crown confessed to be an ample provision for the support of its dignity: and this without deigning, or rather fearing to give an account of the manner of its being laid out.—Wherefore I ask, if those are what we are to understand to be the court mode of lightening the burdens of the people, together with the misapplication of near one million and a half of the sinking fund, which originally was intended and appropriated for the discharge of the national debt.—Why was not either Guadaloupe, Martinique, or the Havanna retained upon the last peace? Why was a great part of the fishery upon our American coast given up to the French by the same treaty? Was all this done to ease the burdens of the people, by disabling them to pay the taxes; or was it done to ease their pockets of their money, by putting them to the expence

expence of those conquests, and by after cessions depriving them of the means of reimbursement ? —But all those seeming contrarieties are easily reconciled, when it is considered that a rich, opulent, and high-spirited people are always dangerous when they conceive themselves injured.

Wherefore this spirit must be broken ; two principle modes offer themselves,—The one, a further and great extension of taxes, so as to exhaust the riches of individuals, and draw off the profits of the most flourishing trade ;—The other, to destroy that trade. This last, though seemingly the most dangerous, is notwithstanding much the safest, because it is a villainy of that enormous magnitude, that till it has happened, it will not be believed to have been intended, and consequently guarded against. Whereas the other, striking by little and little, when it approaches the quick, it may stimulate a timely exertion to repel any further progress, and thereby disappoint the intention ; wherefore the destruction of the trade will be the most certain of the two modes, and also the most expeditious. —No small inducement to a man who wishes to use the work of his own hands.

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But how can this be done without the consent, or sufferance of the people at large? And who will be mad or foolish enough to suppose that they will consent, or suffer an act which must finally rob them of their properties and liberties? I answer, no body, *under the idea* of the people's thinking it would have such an effect. But when they are made to believe that their security, wealth, and growing trade, which were gained by one mode, i. e. *encouragement*, can only be preserved by another, i. e. *taxation*, they will naturally fall into this other, though ever so novel * and foreign to the wisdom of their former rich experience. Now if this should fail through a successful resistance against the whole force of the nation, it must be evident, that the national will, must have gone with this force, otherwise it could not have been so fully exerted; wherefore, the people who resisted, if they should conceive that they are unjustly attacked, must look

* Governor Bernard speaking of the Stamp Act in one of his dispatches of November, 1765, says, that "it must have been supposed, *such an INNOVATION as a Parliamentary taxation*, would cause a great alarm, and meet with much opposition in most parts of America; it was quite new to the people, and had no visible bounds set to it." Again he says, "was this a time to introduce so great a novelty as a Parliamentary inland taxation in America?"

look upon those who attacked them as their worst enemies, and consequently will take every precaution their wisdom suggests, to weaken and distress a people, whom they say endeavoured to destroy them, because they would not become their slaves. This, say they, their future safety will require; wherefore they must bring into their views, or subdue the Canadians, the few inhabitants of Nova Scotia, and the Floridas, which by them will hardly deserve the appellation of conquests. Those parts reduced, the West-India trade must fall, either by famine, or a removal of the inhabitants; and with that the African, which hath already received a very severe blow by the loss of Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia.* Thus half the trade of Great Britain being annihilated, half the manufacturers must starve or

* This has been felt at Liverpool (see the accounts of beginning of September) where the stoppages of trade have occasioned the laying up of several ships, the discharge of many seamen, and consequent lowering the wages of the rest; all which brought on a most alarming insurrection of that once useful body of people. However it is *for the present* suppressed, not by complying with their reasonable demands for accustomed allowances, but by terrifying them with the slaughter of some of their comrades, by a detachment of soldiers, who were ordered to fire amongst them.

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emigrate to foreign parts, if they are not disposed of and slaughtered in the army in America. Lewis XIV. upon the close of one of his bloodiest wars, wanting recruits very much to fill up the losses in his army, but finding his subjects, from a dislike to the service, would not enlist, had no scheme left, but a most extraordinary one of compulsion, which was starving them into his army, by monopolizing all the corn of France, and retailing it only to the soldiery, until all the levies were made. This was one dreadful effect of an arbitrary government.

It is said, that when a noble Lord represented the ruin which must fall upon our manufacturers, in consequence of the present measures, a Great Personage, with a humanity peculiar to himself, made answer, "*let them enlist for soldiers, and then they will not starve.*"

But should our manufacturers not be disposed of in this manner, they will most probably go to the Americans, who will give them freeholds, and thereby so encrease their yeomanry, that the united power of Europe could with difficulty injure them, whilst ruin must fall upon us who remain behind without trade, without useful and industrious people, with a debt of one hundred and forty odd millions, an heavy civil establishment

establishment of eight hundred thousand pounds per ann. which, it seems, is to be encreased to the enormous sum of one million. Another instance of the mode of lightening our burdens, as the taxes must be proportionably encreased; as well to defray this, as to supply the deficiencies occasioned by the loss of trade; and also to discharge the annual expence of carrying on a most dangerous war against our fellow-subjects three thousand miles from home; so that the current out goings of these calamitous times cannot be short of fifteen millions, allowing for advantages taken by money lenders. To defray this, supposing we were not to suffer in our trade, the taxes must be nearly doubled. But when we consider the consequences of the facts proved before the House of Commons, we must, however melancholy the idea, admit that the trade, and therefore the abilities of the nation, will be lessened near one half; the taxes, on the other hand, encreased almost to the double. Hence the real annual expence of this war, together with the current expences of the nation, must fall upon the people in near a four-fold manner, and stand thus—Loss of trade seven million, supplies fifteen—in the whole twenty-two millions; to defray fifteen of which we shall be left aggregately and indi-

vidually one half of what we possessed at the commencement of this cruel and unnatural war. How long this nation will be able to support itself under this enormous load, I fear to say—Suppose three years with destructive vigour; I call it destructive, because all the powers of the people will be called forth and expended, so that the nation, or body politic, being left lifeless and inanimate, like the natural body after its convulsive struggles against death, like that too must become the prey of insects, though of a different species. But before it comes to this, what a variety of public and private distresses will every where be presented,—fathers, sons, and brothers, murdering and butchering each other; others taken off by shipwreck, famine, and plagues, the usual and never-failing concomitants of such wars. Hence a general mourning of the soul (not the fashionable trappings of those courtly times, which levels all distinctions of persons and causes, the saint or the Devil with royal blood, alike, blacking every body in this polite country, almost from the shoe-black to his Grace.) But to compleat the scene, by filling up the measure of our woe, miseries of a more severe kind, because more lasting, are to be added—I mean public and private bankruptcies, which must

must involve in one ruin, all those whose properties are in the funds, in national and private banks, trade, and the mortgagers of land. As to estates in houses they will scarcely be of any value, as many of them, for want of inhabitants, must fall to the ground.

Now that such bankruptcies and consequent evils must happen, will be evident from the consideration of what went before, because a loss of trade must occasion a great scarcity of money, with a great and general want of credit. And as the 140 odd millions public funds exist by credit alone, i.e. upon the faith of Parliament, there not being one shilling of it secured upon lands, houses, shipping, goods, money, or bullion, the instant this credit is touched, the whole must vanish into air; for though an act of Parliament may lay a mighty empire in ruins, it cannot coin a single guinea without gold to work upon. But where will gold be had, when the trade which always did, and only can bring it, is destroyed? And as this trade furnished the supplies, they must necessarily fall with it. Hence an absolute impossibility of paying the dividends, as in a short time there will be nothing to pay them with. This must ruin the Bank of England, its property being principally in the funds; therefore
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it will not be able to pay off its own dividends, or even bills, the latter infinitely exceeding the cash in hand. Hence the stoppage of their currency, as no body will give what is valuable,—for that which has no value. All the other companies and banks depending upon the stocks, national, bank and public credit, will share the common and mighty ruin that finally must fall upon the deluded people.

All which consequences, I presume, Lord Hillsborough revolved in his mind, upon his writing a circular letter to the American Governors in May 1769, upon the repeal of some duties laid in 1767. His Lordship wrote as Secretary of State, with the approbation of the rest of the Ministry. His sentiments then being the sentiments of government, we shall find them in direct conformity with our conclusion. His words are, “that the repeal was made in order to regain the confidence and affection of the American colonies, on which the *glory and safety* of the British empire depend.”

Now with respect to the modes of lightening the taxes of a great nation there are but two,—the one a real œconomy on the part of government, that will lop off, *instead of augmenting*, all useless places and works; *as also* all exorbitant and unmerited pensions, and grants of money,

money, whether to members of Parliament, or an *individual*, to be placed in foreign funds, either to satisfy motives of avarice, or expected exigencies.—Those savings would be immense.

The other mode of easing the people is, by encreasing their ability to pay. This can only be done by extending a profitable commerce, and thereby encreasing the manufactures and manufacturers throughout the realm: Hence an augmentation of industrious and rich people. Wherefore supposing the taxes to be the same, they must be felt in like manner, as the same weight is by a child when five years old, and when grown to the vigour of manhood. At the first period he almost sinks under it, at the last it is but a feather. All other modes, however sanctified by legislative ordinances, must bring destruction upon the people who may unhappily adopt them. Witness the Romans, whose provincial taxes were all used to bribe and corrupt the people to such a degree, that being fed at what was then called the public expence, i. e. the expence of the dependencies,—they fell into sloth,—they became poor;—they neglected agriculture and war, their former supports;—they became cowards,—they became slaves,

slaves, and their posterity, at this day, are the most miserable of all miserable wretches.

Spain furnishes us with another more recent and familiar instance. That nation, once the terror of the world, has been daily and hourly declining, from the moment of her having drawn, by exactions, the wealth of the South Western provinces of America. Nor could it be otherwise: corruption and sloth being inseparable attendants upon wealth that is acquired by any other medium than honest industry: the latter being an exercise of virtue that strengthens the national habit, at the same time that it gradually encreases the riches of the individual: Whereas, the mode by *foreign exaction*, bringing in money without the labour of the people at home, and being the great support of government, it necessarily must hold the first place in the estimation of the Governors; therefore with them all other interests will become vile and subservient to this; the labour of the people will not be so much wanted, consequently not so much exerted: Hence idleness and sloth, which must produce poverty and wretchedness. Thus government holding its supplies, and the people losing theirs, must necessarily become richer than them, and in the end sole proprietor of all the pro-

property, and in course, power of the nation: Hence the unavoidable and absolute slavery of the people.—And so it has happened in Spain, who is so fallen that her foldiers have lost their courage, her Generals their conduct, and in the room of all her former blessings, there is substituted—a sacred tyrant, poverty, slavery, and an impotent insolence of pride, which precipitates her into pernicious exertions of her shadowy strength.

That the present military exertions of George III. have not yet turned out otherwise, must be evident from the defeat of ten companies of grenadiers, and ten of light infantry, being the flower of the Royal army, under Col. Smith, at Concord; and their subsequent defeat when reinforced by three battalions under Lord Percy, at Lexington, the whole forming a body of 1912 men, being four battalions and four companies, at 470 to a battalion, if compleat, officers included, who were pursued and harrassed for fifteen miles, till they got under the cover of the men of war. The troops who defeated them, were what in our reviews, and upon our parades, we should call raw recruits, whose numbers, by every information that was collected, were inferior to those whom they routed; and yet the officers I have mentioned as com-

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manding the regulars, are men of known bravery. Lord Percy I had the honour of being intimately acquainted with, and know that in his labours with the fifth regiment, of which he is Colonel, he was indefatigable. At Charles-Town, half his regiment was killed and wounded. As to Colonel Smith, he is a very old, experienced, and well-known officer.—The bravery of the British troops have stood the test of ages.

—A question naturally arises here.—How came this knowledge, experience, and bravery to be worsted? The answer is obvious—the one fights for 3s. 5d. per week,—the other thinks he fights pro aris & focis, for his altar and fire side:—his religion, his wife, his children, his house, his property and liberty; motives against which human nature can bring none so powerful, because none so interesting: And as man under the influence of his passions, is but a machine, whose momentum must necessarily increase with the force which sets it in motion; it is evident that the American, who is stimulated by all the motives we have mentioned, must, from a physical necessity, be a man of a more persevering courage and spirit, than the foldier who only fights for what he is sure

sure to have if he survives, whether he is, or is not defeated.

—Hence so long as the American troops continue to think that their all depends upon their courage and conduct, so long must they be more deliberately and perseveringly braver than the standing army that is opposed to them. And so the event has hitherto proved. As also the stand made at Charles-Town by 1500 Provincials, commanded by a Physician, Dr. Warren, against eight battalions, of eight companies each, and twenty companies of grenadiers and light infantry, which, if complete, made a body of 3948 men, officers included, exclusive of artillery, together with the assistance of the men of war; the whole under the command of as brave an officer as ever led troops to action, I mean Major General Howe, who lost, in killed and wounded, 92 officers, and 1000 non-commissioned officers and private men, in forcing the Provincials to retire to a neighbouring hill—although they had but an ill-constructed, unfinished redoubt of five pieces of cannon, made without fascines, pickets, or even the earth beat down; yet such was the defence from behind the trenches, that if the town upon the right had not been set on fire, as the Gazette says, in a critical minute, which

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gave the regulars an opportunity of entering at that side, they probably never would have been forced or turned; for so many of the assailants were killed and wounded, that their army was quite crippled.—Nay, it is said, that before this firing of the town, the resolution of the Provincials was so great, as to put the regulars into such disorder, that General Howe was, at a particular time, abandoned in the field, having none about him but his Aid de Camps, some of whom were killed, others wounded, on each side of him. One of the regiments which first gave way has been spoken of with great severity, as that it ought to be broke or incorporated into other regiments, and that it was intended to be done; but if it was disordered by an excessive weight of fire, and afterwards rallied and behaved with firmness, which I have heard they did, I think it ought to wipe off the first misfortune, and the more particularly, when it is considered that a spirit of mutiny was encouraged in this very regiment, by a Lieutenant General, (whom I have characterized under the appellation of a mischievous buffoon) in order to make vacancies to be filled through his recommendation.

But to return to the action and take an impartial view, it must appear that the success
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of the King's troops turned upon the burning of the town, which they set on fire at a critical moment. This furnished an opportunity of turning the trenches, by entering at their unfinished redoubt; which being done, the affair was all over;—because the troops in the trenches are always thinly formed; consequently, when their flanks are exposed and closely attacked, as must be the case when trenches are entered, particularly in this manner, they cannot form with bayonets at their breasts; therefore they have nothing for it, but to make the best retreat they can, it being well known that trenches once entered, are scarcely ever recovered. But had the Provincials had time to have thrown up works to retire behind, upon an emergency of this kind, which should have been provided against, it is evident the attack must have failed;—or had they attacked and come down upon the regulars the instant they repulsed them, and drove them away in such confusion, they must have cut them in pieces, or forced them with prodigious loss on board their boats.—Or had a communication been preserved between them and their camp, so as that they could have been seasonably supported, which according to the most simple and obvious rules of war should have been done, it must appear

appear that a reinforcement of two thousand fresh troops, falling upon an army already so weakened by losses, and debilitated by fatigue, they must have cut off or taken prisoners, the whole detachment, and thereby obliged General Gage, with his remaining little army, to surrender, or abandon Boston and go on board the fleet.—This would have been a stroke indeed.

Here a certain question will not be improper. Was it politic to disoblige so active, experienced, and knowing an officer as Major Lee, for a company in the guards, which was promised to him? May not he, as Major General of the Provincials, do more harm to the King's cause, than all his Tory friends will do it good? Are these times to make enemies of men of abilities, when all is at stake, and consequently their abilities, like a two-edged sword, will serve either way? Suppose this officer had commanded the next camp to Charles-Town, and that he had considered the last as an out post, either occasionally to watch, annoy, or draw a detachment of those, whom he might have looked upon to be enemies, out of their strong camp, in order to fall upon them with advantage (which most probably would have been his idea) therefore he would have been always ready to have supported this post,

post, according to exigencies.—The consequence of which must have been fatal to the whole of the Royal army.

But to return to losses by the late military exertions.—We must not omit Crown Point and Ticonderago, with twelve intire provinces, the most opulent in the world : to all which must be added the present inglorious blockade of the Royal army in and before Boston ; an infamy unprecedented in the annals of Great Britain. The half of this army, it was said in the House of Commons, would be more than sufficient to reduce America ; as the *King's friends* said, both there, and in the House of Lords, that the Americans dare not fight, therefore the troops were to act by detachment.—Such was the opinion of our rulers, and the orders were agreeable to it.—The event we have seen to be most calamitous. Now what can be said in exculpation of ministers, who have shewn themselves so grossly ignorant of every thing they should be well acquainted with ? If they say they were mis-informed : we reply, that their ignorance is but pretended, being wickedly wilful, as must appear by their daily loading Bernard, Hutchinson, &c. &c. who are the informants, with places, pensions, and honors.

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To the losses above mentioned we must add the present sickly state of the army, proceeding from almost incessant duty—hard and cold laying upon the bare ground, having no straw for their beds; and salt provisions; all of which causes have brought on a dreadful and encreasing flux, that sweeps away more men than even the cannon and musquetry of the Provincials. And if we consider the nature of this disorder, we must know, that by long continuance, it changes from bad to worse, till, through a great inveteracy, it becomes contagious, and so taints the air. This stage of it, in effect, and actually is a plague. Now what probability is there of removing it?—Is it the continuance of the causes that produced it, or the increase of the first, viz. severe duty, which must inevitably be the case, to a most calamitous degree of distress; for as the time is approaching, when no recruits or reinforcement can be sent out, the numbers fit for duty at Boston must daily, if not hourly decrease, by sickness and death: Proportionably then to this loss, must be the increased duty of those who remain.—A new, superadded, and growing evil, that in its turn will produce others, through excess of fatigue; viz. sickness and death.—If to all this we add their being closely blockaded by a vigilant,

gilant, active, and resolute army, whose trenches, lined with five and twenty thousand men, are fortified with redoubts, redans, &c. and extend fifteen miles from the East of Dorchester, to the North of Cambridge, with other lines to support those—therefore as the intention of making these lines was to distress the Royalists—we must suppose that as they have such an abundance of men, they will, by repeated feint, and some real attacks, endeavour to keep the whole of the King's army upon continual duty; this must so weaken them, as in a short time to render the major part of them unfit for service; consequently many works must be abandoned for want of soldiers to defend them; which being known by the Provincials, they will threaten on all sides, and finding some defenceless—will in them succeed.—Thus the destruction of the present army of British soldiers under General Gage at Boston, appears to me inevitable.—Here a man, whose very early and happiest days have been spent in the camp, may be allowed to drop a tear over the present distress, and at the impending ruin of ten thousand of his once brother soldiers.

Dreadful as the above event is, it is not unexpected by our managers, who have sent in-

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structions to General Gage to call a Council of War, to consist of the general officers of the army, and the Admiral and chief officers of the navy, to consider what shall be done with the troops, whether to re-embark them, and land in Rhode, or Long Island, where, in the spring, they are to be reinforced with twenty thousand men.

Now how General Gage will be able to accomplish this re-embarkation, without the loss of near one fourth of his army, and almost the whole of his artillery, is a matter to be considered: The Provincials being within sight, we must suppose they will not neglect *a moment* so favourable to their cause. If the artillery should be first withdrawn the works will be defenceless, therefore the Provincials will immediately attack, and over-power, by their numbers, the army at Boston.—Hence one promiscuous and bloody carnage of the whole.

If on the other hand he should leave the artillery upon the works in order to cover the re-embarkation, he must leave a numerous rear guard, as well to make a shew of force in order to intimidate the Provincials from interrupting the retreat of the main body, as also to be strong enough to defend those works should they be attacked. This latter disposition may save the principal

principrl part of the army, but what is to become of the rear guard and artillery? for the instant they quit the redoubts, lines, and bastions (as to preserving the cannon the idea must be abandoned) the Americans will pour in upon them, and cut them all off.—Thus the whole army must be destroyed, or the rear guard and almost all the artillery lost. A miserable, but unavoidable alternative of those modes.

There are two others: the first is a reconciliation; but as our managers will not adopt this, unless the Americans submit to be slaves, we will consider the remaining mode—it is, to enter into a regular capitulation with the Provincials—that the town of Boston, and the works shall be surrendered, without present or future injury, during the war and present disagreement between the colonies and the Crown and Parliament—provided General Gage and the Royal army are permitted to re-embark without interruption or molestation, together with all the artillery, ammunition, stores, and provisions. These are humiliating terms to be sure, for an army that our managers said “was to drive those cowardly Provincials into the lakes, or over the Apalachians;” but tempora mutantur, the times are changed, and the Royalists driven into the sea.—Sad tidings for the heroes of our

Court majority, whose great revenge, *upon parliamentary ground*, had stomachs for all the poor Yankees.

It remains now to be considered, whether the new idea of landing, in the spring, 25,000 men at New-York, will have any other effect than the 12,000 had at Boston.—I think the final event will be the same, but the means that bring it about more bloody and calamitous;—because the numbers and field of action will be greater. How can it be conceived, after one province, and that supposed to be the most dastardly, had destroyed an army of 12,000 regulars, with raw, hastily raised, undisciplined peasants—that 25,000 should conquer twelve provinces, whose troops, including the conquering, will be well trained, and, flushed with the victories of the latter, as well as emulous to equal, if not rival them; more particularly as those provinces, taking every ninth person, an easy levy, can arm 300,000 men, whose hearts are as brave as our own.—What then, but the wildest imagination can suppose, that 25,000 or 50,000 troops, will subdue twelve times the number of the first, and six times that of the last.—The idea ceases to be ridiculous, because it is ruinous.—King William, whom even Doctor Shebbeare will allow to have been a brave, experienced officer,
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was four years reducing the rebellious Papists in Ireland, though he was assisted by that great General the Marshal Duke of Schomberg, with an army of 30,000 infantry, and 8,000 cavalry, with a great part of that kingdom in his hands, and supported by every Protestant in it, particularly the Dissenters—one ground of the Doctor's hatred—yet the King's success in so short a time, was looked upon as wonderfully fortunate.

The English army was supplied from England, otherwise they must have all perished; and as it was, they suffered prodigiously by frequent interruptions. Their coming depending so much upon the wind and weather, as well as upon the posts and vigilance of the enemy, who often intercepted their convoys, and so cut off the supplies.—Now suppose Ireland, instead of 60, had been 3,000 miles from England, must not all the above hazards, difficulties, and wants have been proportionably increased; so that the success which at the first distance was accounted almost miraculous, at the last, should not be expected but by fools and madmen.—The twelve provinces to be subdued are 1000 and more leagues from England, their inhabitants wonderfully unanimous against the present measures, and the whole of their continent (being at least
twelve

twelve times greater than that possessed by the Irish rebels) save about four miles in circumference, is in their own hands. Here then are new and mighty difficulties.—Cannot they, and the impending calamitous consequences of the whole war be avoided?—They can.—How?—By repealing the disputed acts, and giving up the late parliamentary claim of taxation.

If the present ministers will effect this, and rescind the resolution upon the Middlesex election, they will meet the hearty concurrence of all honest men, and the great Whig leaders will give up all personal hopes of emolument, to the more generous desires of averting the public ruin.

This must be evident from that healing, conciliatory bill, presented to the House of Lords, by a nobleman who had once before not only saved his country from ruin, but raised her to a height of glory and power, at once the wonder and terror of the world. This bill of the Earl of Chatham was supported by the other great Whig Lords, who now compose the Minority in the House of Lords; amongst whom Lord Camden, late Lord High Chancellor of England, a nobleman whose virtues, like a glory, illumined the High Court he presided in, not only supported this patriotic measure, but upon
all

all questions of government, with the whole of his great abilities, assisted the ministry, and even endeavoured to lure them into the true interests of their country.—As also did the Duke of Richmond with his usual spirit and good understanding. And in the House of Commons, Mr. Burke, who in his own, spoke the sentiments of the Rockingham and Shelburne parties, proposed resolutions that went to the matter of the above bill. He was supported by all the interest of the great leaders alluded to, and by all the Whigs of the Lower House. Nothing sure could be more praise-worthy, ~~nothing more~~ generous, than this conduct of the Minority; thus nobly to step forward, and with a greatness of spirit peculiar to men, whose first object is their country, lay aside all personal considerations, to plan and advise a measure to be executed by their Tory adversaries, that would have been so salutary in its consequences, that it must have removed the present odium with which they are so justly loaded; and by restoring the empire to its former tranquillity, happiness, and glory, leave the ministers and party by whom they have been ill treated, in the secure possession (to the exclusion of themselves) of all the offices and employments of the state.

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It now only remains to be considered what part our natural enemies, France and Spain, will take in this unnatural war—the first, I suppose, has not forgot our having supported two rebellions in her very bowels, and also the mighty defeats of French armies, and dreadful slaughter of French men, by an English General, the immortal John Duke of Marlborough, thereby preventing Lewis the XIVth from over-running the continent, and establishing an universal empire. It must be confessed indeed, that the domestic enemies of England's glory, and England's liberties—the English Tories, by disgracing the Duke of Marlborough—by separating the English from the allied army, and by the infamous and pernicious cessions at Utrecht, did all in their power to win the GOOD GRACES of the French monarch.—But to descend to our own times. Though we may suppose that France will forgive us the open, manly, glorious, and wonderfully successful exertion of British arms, under the auspices of that FIRST, and, I fear,——LAST of Englishmen, the EARL OF CHATHAM—it is not safe for us to believe that she has forgotten, or will not make reprisals, for the seizing, as she says, in times of peace, most of her merchant ships which were
private

private property—for to this hour all Frenchmen term it an act of the blackest piracy.

As to Spain, she remembers our effectual support of seven of her revolted provinces in the low countries;—our endeavouring, after the death of her Charles the II^d. to dethrone the King of her choice, and to impose another upon her;—our laying waste her most fertile provinces with fire and sword, in order to effect this, as well as to aid and assist those, whom, in our present Court language, we must call the rebellious Catalonians, and others.—She also remembers her disgraces the last war, as to her losses—British Tories, *as usual*, took care that she should have no cause to remember them. From all which we must conclude, that at first those powers will give the American English all the private support they can; and as soon as they find that the former, upon feeling themselves pressed with the last necessity, in order, as they think, to avert it, shall declare themselves independent states, and invite all the powers of Europe, *save this*, to partipate the benefits of their trade.—Then, when our empire is dismembered, ourselves disunited and dissatisfied, our burdens insufferable, our resources none, they will fall upon us: and

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after deluging our fair isle with its best blood—
 Briton, I fear, will become a province to
 France.

Here it will not be impertinent to shew the
 judgment of England in the reigns of Eliza-
 beth, James the 1st. Charles the 1st. and
 Queen Ann—upon civil wars; and which side
 this nation deemed to be rebels.

Philip the 2d. of Spain persecuted all his
 subjects of the reformed religion in the Low
 Countries, which occasioned their revolt. He
 also introduced the Inquisition, and augmented
 the numbers of the Bishops from four to four-
 teen, which occasioned a rising amongst the
 Roman Catholics.—What part did England
 take?—Her Queen Elizabeth first gave the
 oppressed subjects all the assistance she could,—
 the Parliament did the same, and the whole
 body of the clergy assembled did as much.—
 Here then is a full and free judgment of all the
 estates of the realm of England manifested by
 actions and support,—that the subjects who
 then resisted their legislative power, were not
 rebels, but innocent and oppressed people me-
 riting commiseration and support.

—James the 1st. was supported by England
 and Scotland in the assistance he gave the Prince
 Palatine,

Palatine, who was injured by his superior Lord
—the Emperor.

—Charles the 1st. supported the Rochel-
lers against their legislature.

—Queen Ann did the same by the Catalo-
nians in Spain, and the poor people of the Ce-
vennes in France, the latter being persecuted
by the cruel domination of Lewis the XIVth.

These and numberless other instances are all
authorities against the doctrine of unlimited
non-resistance: and evidently shew, that those
who resisted were innocent; and *those* who
forced them to resist were—*Traitors* and
Rebels.

F I N I S.

